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ABSTRACT. It is commonly stated, by both whistleblower protection laws and
political philosophers, that a breach of state secrecy by disclosing classified doc-
uments is justified if it serves the public interest. The problem with this defense of
justified whistleblowing, however, is that the operative term – the public interest –
is all too often left unclarified. This is problematic, because it leaves potential
whistleblowers without sufficient certainty that their disclosures will be covered
by the defense, leading many to err on the side of caution and remain silent,
depriving the public of much-needed information. Failing an agreed upon defini-
tion of the public interest or a process to determine it, judges’ applications of the
public interest in whistleblowing cases have been criticized for demonstrating
‘judicial idiosyncrasy’. The present paper, therefore, sets out to (1) provide some
clarity concerning the concept of the public interest, and (2) to ascertain the extent
to which a public interest defense for whistleblowing is feasible and desirable.
I. INTRODUCING THE PROBLEM
Contemporary liberal democracies recognize the importance of cit-
izens having access to government information. Transparency is of
fundamental importance for an informed public debate as well as for
democratic accountability, which is why many countries have free-
dom of information laws. Nonetheless, few support Julian Assange’s
call for complete transparency and his rejection of legitimate secrets.
Even NGOs promoting transparency such as Transparency Inter-
national are prepared to allow for exceptions when national security
and official secrets are involved.1 At times, it is necessary and
1 Mark Worth, Whistleblowing in Europe: Legal Protections for Whistleblowers in the EU. (Transparency
International, 2013), p. 89. Available at: https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/
whistleblowing_in_europe_legal_protections_for_whistleblowers_in_the_eu.
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legitimate for governments to keep certain information secret.
Accordingly, citizens’ access to information may be limited. For
example, in the United States the ‘Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) explicitly exempts properly classified information from dis-
closure, protecting any document properly classified from release in
response to a public request’.2 Despite the prohibition on disclosing
classified documents, however, government secrets are on a rela-
tively regular basis made public by whistleblowers. Such unautho-
rized disclosures will be the topic of this article. I will thus not be
concerned with internal whistleblowing or with disclosures made to
the appropriate external oversight bodies, as these are generally
protected by whistleblower protection legislation (at least on paper).
Instead, the focus will lie on unauthorized public disclosures (typi-
cally to the media) of classified government documents (typically (but
not necessarily3) by civil servants), that is, on what I call classified
public whistleblowing.4
There is broad consensus among scholars that whistleblowing
requires justification; that is, it constitutes a (pro tanto) wrongful act.
One could argue, for example, that unauthorized disclosures con-
stitute a breach of promissory obligations (given that civil servants
are often made to swear an oath to respect the confidential nature of
the information they encounter in the course of their professional
activities) and are, therefore, wrongful.5 Others condemn unautho-
rized disclosures because they believe such disclosures jeopardize
national security. This reasoning is particularly prevalent in intelli-
gence circles, but Seana Shiffrin has similarly condemned Snowden’s
actions as ‘negligent with respect to the possible harm he might
cause to people and institutions’.6 Alternatively, one could appeal to
a traditional understanding of civil servants’ role responsibilities and
2 Mark Fenster, ‘Disclosure’s Effects: WikiLeaks and Transparency’, Iowa Law Review 97 (2012): pp.
753–807, p. 756.
3 After all, one of the best-known whistleblowers of today, Edward Snowden, disclosed classified
government documents, but was himself not an employee of the government but rather a contractor
for Booz Allen Hamilton.
4 ‘Classified’ in the sense that state secrets are involved; ‘public’ in the sense that the information is
disclosed to the public (typically via the media), as opposed to an internal or external supervisory body.
5 Eric R. Boot, ‘Classified Public Whistleblowing: How to Justify a pro tanto Wrong’, Social Theory
and Practice 43(3) (2017): pp. 541–567, pp. 546–8; Sissela Bok, Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and
Revelation (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), p. 221.
6 Seana Shiffrin, ‘The Moral Neglect of Negligence’, in David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and Steve
Wall (eds.), Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy. Volume 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp.
197–228, p. 213.
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argue that civil servants owe their superiors strict obedience. Their
own political preferences and moral beliefs are not to influence the
execution of their tasks. They ought to be impartial and to serve
each administration equally well.7
Most commonly, however, whistleblowing is deemed wrongful
because it involves a wrongful arrogation to oneself of a superior say
in public matters, thus failing to respect one of the cornerstones of
democratic politics, namely the equal political rights of all citizens.
As Thomas Christiano explains, a democratic decision-making pro-
cess is the only way to reconcile (1) the need for a single system of
laws with (2) persistent widespread disagreement, and (3) the
requirement of justice to give each an equal say in how we organize
our polity. The thought is that the representatives in the democratic
legislature can stand for the great variety of political preferences in a
polity. The legislature can thus embody the entire citizenry, and its
actions may be viewed as ‘the pooled exercises of the political rights
of all the citizens’.8 Now, when a whistleblower discloses classified
government documents, she is, in effect, arrogating to herself a
superior say in the organization of the polity by usurping the power
to decide what is and what is not a legitimate state secret, whereas
this is properly the prerogative of our democratically elected offi-
cials.9 This is what Candice Delmas has called political vigilantism.10
As Rahul Sagar puts it: ‘[W]hen unauthorized disclosures occur, vital
decisions on matters of national security are effectively being made
by private actors, an outcome that violates the democratic ideal that
7 See, e.g., Max Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’, in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), H. H.
Gerth and C. Wright Mills (trans), Essays in Sociology (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 77–128, p. 95: ‘The
honor of the civil servant is vested in his ability to execute conscientiously the order of the superior
authorities, exactly as if the order agreed with his own conviction’. But see Boot, ‘Classified Public
Whistleblowing’, pp. 551ff, supra note 5.
8 Thomas Christiano, The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and its Limits (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008), p. 248. According to Christiano, the fact that the democratic authority can thus
be understood to represent the entire body of citizens, ensuring the equal political rights of each, is
what gives it a right to rule. It is also what justifies the citizens’ correlative duty to obey.
9 This is what sets whistleblowing apart from civil disobedience. The very act of whistleblowing
immediately, performatively as it were, undoes the decision (made by democratically elected officials)
to keep a certain piece of information secret, whereas civil disobedients only wish to protest a particular
policy that they oppose and aim to have reformed or repealed entirely by the democratic authority.
Whistleblowers may have this same aim, but they, in addition, appropriate for themselves the power to
decide what is and what is not a legitimate state secret, whereas this is properly the prerogative of our
democratically elected officials.
10 Candice Delmas, ‘The Ethics of Government Whistleblowing’, Social Theory and Practice 41(1)
(2015): pp. 77–105, p. 94.
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such decisions should be made by persons or institutions that have
been directly or indirectly endorsed by citizens’.11
If one finds any (or all, or several) of these arguments convincing
and agrees that whistleblowing constitutes a (at least pro tanto)
wrongful act, it follows that it is morally correct to maintain a legal
prohibition of unauthorized disclosures. From a prudential view-
point a prohibition is a good idea as well, as it can help prevent
misguided or willfully false disclosures. And indeed, though many
countries are adopting whistleblower protection laws, protecting
those who disclose wrongdoing internally or to the appropriate
external supervisory bodies, no country, to my knowledge, grants
citizens a right to legal protection against retaliation following an
unauthorized disclosure of classified materials to the media. Indeed,
the UK’s Official Secrets Act, for example, flatly denies (former)
members of the security services a right, ‘even as a last resort and
even in the face of the most serious iniquity, to make a general
disclosure’.12 Similarly, in the United States, federal government
employees in general, let alone whistleblowers from the intelligence
community, are not protected from retaliation if the information
disclosed had been properly classified.13
Yet, though classified public whistleblowing is illegal, it has also
become one of our main sources of information concerning gov-
ernment wrongdoing. Given this vital social service provided by
whistleblowers, many argue that whistleblowers ought to enjoy
some measure of legal protection, lest a chilling effect cause future
potential whistleblowers to refrain from disclosing government
wrongdoing, leaving the public ignorant of abuse of power, human
rights violations, and the like.
The problem is the following: We wish to maintain the legal
prohibition of whistleblowing in place but we also wish to provide
justified acts of whistleblowing protection against legal sanctions.
The former wish seems to exclude one of the most commonly
mounted defenses of whistleblowing, namely that unauthorized
disclosures ought to enjoy protection based on the whistleblower’s
11 Rahul Sagar, Secrets and Leaks: The Dilemma of State Secrecy (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2013), p. 114; cf. Shiffrin, ‘Moral Neglect of Negligence’, p. 210, supra note 6.
12 John Bowers QC, Martin Fodder, Jeremy Lewis, and Jack Mitchell, Whistleblowing: Law and
Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 315.
13 5 USC § 2302(b)(8) (2012).
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individual right to freedom of expression. Accordingly, when
whistleblowing cases are brought before the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR), the defendant claims that the state has
violated her article 10 right to freedom of expression.14 Similarly, in
the American context, defendants have appealed to their First
Amendment rights.15 Those who wish to grant whistleblowers legal
protection based on a right to whistleblowing included in the right to
freedom of expression construe the latter right broadly as a ‘right to
seek, receive, use and impart information’.16 It follows that sanctions
against whistleblowers are to be understood as violations of rights,
provided certain conditions are met.17
This defense has proven problematic as it seems to involve such a
chimera as a legal right to break the law. Furthermore, an individual-
rights-based defense of whistleblowing does not do justice to the fact
that the importance of unauthorized disclosures does not so much lie
in its being an expression of individual liberty that requires legal
protection, but rather in the public importance of such disclosures18;
the defense ought to, therefore, not be based on individual rights but
on whistleblowers’ public role.
This brings us to the second most commonly proposed defense of
whistleblowers, which will be the topic of the present paper: It is
often said that unauthorized disclosures may be justified, and thus
warrant legal protection against retaliation, if such disclosures reveal
information that is in the public interest. In practice, this would in-
volve setting up a criminal defense for whistleblowers. As a justifi-
cation defense, such a ‘public interest defense’ strikes a balance
between, on the one hand, recognizing the importance of the
democratic allocation of power (and thus maintaining the legal
prohibition of whistleblowing) and, on the other hand, providing
justified whistleblowers with the necessary legal protection. In this
14 See, e.g., European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) (Grand Chamber). Guja v. Moldova. 12
February 2008. Application No. 14277/04, § 76.
15 See, e.g., Mika C. Morse, ‘Honor or Betrayal? The Ethics of Government Lawyer-Whistleblow-
ers’, Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 23 (2010): pp. 421–454.
16 Open Society Justice Initiative, The Global Principles on National Security and the Right to Information
(Tshwane Principles). 2013, Principle 1. Available at https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/
publications/global-principles-national-security-and-freedom-information-tshwane-principles.
17 Different scholars and courts list different conditions. Some examples are: harm minimization,
exhaustion of legal alternatives, the whistleblower’s good faith, and of course that the disclosed
information must contain evidence of wrongdoing of public concern.
18 Eric R. Boot, ‘No Right to Classified Public Whistleblowing’, Ratio Juris 31(1) (2018): pp. 70–85, p.
71.
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manner, we may continue to benefit in the future from disclosures
that call the authorities to account when it oversteps its bounds.
The problem with this defense of justified whistleblowing, how-
ever, is that the operative term – the public interest – is all too often
left unclarified. Political philosophers,19 legal20 and public adminis-
tration21 scholars, whistleblower protection laws,22 national23 and
international24 guidance documents, courts25 – all agree that a breach
of state secrecy by disclosing classified documents is justified if it
serves the public interest. None of them, however, provide a defi-
nition of what the public interest exactly is, nor do they explain how
we may determine it; at the most, an ad hoc list of offences is drawn
up, the disclosure of which would be in the public interest.
This is problematic because it leaves potential whistleblowers
without sufficient certainty that their disclosures will be covered by
the defense, leading many to err on the side of caution and remain
silent, depriving the public of much-needed information. Failing an
agreed upon definition of the public interest or a process to deter-
mine it, it is up to judges to determine whether a particular disclo-
sure is in the public interest. This, predictably, has led to the critique
19 Bok, Secrets, p. 219, supra note 5; Boot, ‘Classified Public Whistleblowing’, pp. 557–58, supra note
5; Candice Delmas, ‘The Civic Duty to Report Crime and Corruption’, Les ateliers de l’éthique 9(1) (2014):
pp. 50–64, p. 62; Manohar Kumar and Daniele Santoro, ‘A Justification of Whistleblowing’, Philosophy
and Social Criticism 43(7) (2017): pp. 669–684, pp. 8ff.; Sagar, Secrets and Leaks, p. 13 supra note 11.
20 Yochai Benkler, ‘A Public Accountability Defense for National Security Leakers and Whistle-
blowers’, Harvard Law and Policy Review 8 (2014): pp. 281–326; Dimitrios Kagiaros, ‘Protecting ‘‘National
Security’’ Whistleblowers in the Council of Europe: An Evaluation of Three Approaches on How to
Balance National Security with Freedom of Expression’, The International Journal of Human Rights 19(4)
(2015): pp. 408–428.
21 Mark Bovens, The Quest for Responsibility: Accountability and Citizenship in Complex Organisations
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 163ff.
22 The UK Public Interest Disclosure Act; the Dutch Wet huis voor klokkenluiders (House for Whistle-
blowers Act), article 1(d).
23 UK Information Commissioner’s Office, The Public Interest Test: Freedom of Information Act (2016).
Available at: https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1183/the_public_interest_test.
pdf.
24 Tshwane Principles, Principle 37, supra note 16.
25 E.g., ECtHR, Guja v. Moldova, § 74, supra note 14. Specifically, the Court considered whether the
public interest in upholding secrecy was strong enough to warrant a violation of the whistleblower’s
Article 10 right to free speech, or that, instead, the public interest in disclosure argued in favor of
upholding his Article 10 right.
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that applications of the public interest in whistleblowing cases are ad
hoc26 and demonstrate ‘judicial idiosyncrasy’.27 The present paper,
therefore, sets out to (1) provide some clarity concerning the public
interest, and (2) to ascertain the extent to which a public interest
defense for whistleblowers is feasible and desirable. Accordingly, the
paper will be structured as follows: Section II will give an overview
of three common understandings of the public interest (aggregative,
procedural, and unitary) and explain why they are problematic.
Subsequently, Section III presents a more promising alternative,
namely the civic account of the public interest, which I will defend.
In brief, it argues that public interests are those interests that we all
share in our role as members of the public. Next, Section IV provides
a description of how a public interest defense for whistleblowing
could work, given the definition expounded in Section III. I argue
that, for the defense to be fully available to the whistleblower, her
disclosure must meet three conditions: the public interest condition,
the ultimum remedium (or last resort) condition, and the minimize
harm condition. If the first of these conditions is not met, the defense
is unavailable. If, instead, one of the latter two conditions is not met
(or if neither of them is met), the defense will likely serve to mitigate
the sentence rather than function as a full defense. Section V dis-
cusses three possible objections to the public interest defense set out
in Section IV: the epistemic constraints objection, the incommen-
surability of interests objection, and the reasonable disagreement
objection. Section VI concludes.
II. THEORIES OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Though appeals to the public interest are incredibly common in law,
politics, and ordinary speech, they are also made rather casually. As a
consequence, what is meant by ‘the public interest’ typically remains
unclear. Some, however, have held that this lack of clarity is a
necessary characteristic of the concept, dismissing it altogether as
vacuous.28 Others consider the concept a convenient tool for the
26 Aileen McHarg, ‘Reconciling Human Rights and the Public Interest: Conceptual Problems and
Doctrinal Uncertainty in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’, The Modern Law
Review 62(5) (1999): pp. 671–696, p. 683.
27 David Lewis, ‘Is a Public Interest Test for Workplace Whistleblowing in Society’s Interest?’,
International Journal of Law and Management 57(2) (2015): pp. 141–158, p. 143.
28 Glendon Schubert, The Public Interest (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960), pp. 223–24.
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powerful to present their own factional interests as public interests.29
Furthermore, some wonder whether the concept, which appears to
presuppose an interest common to all, can be of any use in con-
temporary pluralistic societies.30 Finally, critics worry that the con-
cept may be abused by demagogues demanding individual sacrifices
for the greater common good.31 Because of these concerns, the
concept has largely fallen out of fashion in legal and political phi-
losophy in recent decades. As a consequence, the concept has re-
tained its problematic protean nature, being used differently by
different people in different contexts. This section will discuss the
three main public interest theories: the aggregative, the procedural,
and the unitary approaches.32 Each of these, however, has serious
drawbacks, prompting me to sketch a more promising account in
Section III.
A. The Aggregative Account
According to Jeremy Bentham, a community consists simply of the
aggregate of its members. It follows that that the ‘interest of the
community then is, what? – the sum of the interests of the several
members who compose it’.33 This is also referred to as Bentham’s
‘compositionalism’.34 Whether a particular action, policy, or law is
conducive to one’s interest depends on its utility: ‘that property in
any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure,
good, or happiness … or (what comes again to the same thing) to
prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the
party whose interest is considered’.35 The question whether a par-
29 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, ‘From ‘‘The German Ideology’’: Chapter One, ‘‘Feuerbach’’’, in
Joseph O’Malley (ed.), Terrell Carver and Daniel Blank (tran.), ‘German Ideology’ Manuscripts: Presentation
and Analysis of the ‘Feuerbach Chapter’ (New York: Palgrave, 2014), p. 183.
30 Ian O’Flynn, ‘Deliberating About the Public Interest’, Res Publica 16(3) (2010): pp. 299–315, p. 300.
31 Jane Mansbridge, ‘On the Contested Nature of the Public Good’, in Walter W. Powell and
Elisabeth Stephanie Clemens (eds.), Private Action and the Public Good (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1998), pp. 3–19, p. 4.
32 For this list of public interest theories, I am indebted to both Virginia Held, The Public Interest and
Individual Interests (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 42–46 and Mansbridge, ‘Contested Nature of the
Public Good’, pp. 9–11, supra note 31, though I depart from both of their lists of categories at times.
33 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, J. H. Burns and H. L. A.
Hart (eds) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 12.
34 Gerald J. Postema, ‘Interests, Universal and Particular: Bentham’s Utilitarian Theory of Value’,
Utilitas 18 (2006): pp. 109–133, p. 111.
35 Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 12, supra note 33.
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ticular law or policy is in the public interest thus comes down to
determining its effects on the happiness or welfare of each of the
individual members that together constitute the public and tallying
the results. If, on balance, the law or policy benefits more individuals
than are harmed by it, this will demonstrate the ‘general good ten-
dency of the act, with respect to the total number or community of
individuals concerned’.36
It follows that there is no distinct ‘public’ with its own interests
separate from the private interests of the sundry individuals that
together make up the public. Rather, the public interest is deter-
mined simply by aggregating the private interests of the individual
members of the public; if a policy is in the private interest of the
majority of those individuals, then it is in the public interest.
The problem with this view is that we often want to distinguish
between majority interests and the public interest. This concern
points toward the idea that the public interest is a moral concept. As
such, it cannot be derived from the empirical observation that the
interests of some individuals outnumber the interests of others.
When we ask ‘Is x in the public interest?’ we want to know some-
thing else than whether x is in the interest of the majority. Fur-
thermore, the aggregative method of determining the public interest
may be considered morally objectionable in that it appears to render
minority interests inferior to majority interests, irrespective of the
content of those interests.
Finally, there is the familiar problem posed by social choice the-
ory, namely that when voters have to make a choice between three
or more alternatives (A, B, and C), there is no fair and rational way to
determine which of these is preferred by a majority, that is, to
convert voters’ preferences into a social decision.37 In its simplest
form, Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem, which demonstrates
this problem, is as follows: suppose three people – Mary, Michael,
36 Ibid., p. 40.
37 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2nd ed. 1963).
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and Molly – are to rate three alternatives (e.g., policies or political
candidates). The following matrix shows their individual preferences:
The matrix shows that a majority prefers A to B (Mary and
Molly), and B to C (Mary and Michael). It would logically follow that
a majority therefore also prefers A to C. Yet, as we can see, a
majority in fact prefers C to A (Michael and Molly). From this matrix,
one could thus both infer that a majority prefers A to C and that a
majority prefers C to A, which is quite impossible. Next to the moral
objections to the aggregative theory mentioned above, there is thus
also the problem of the logical impossibility of distilling a collective
ordering of preferences from the aggregate of individual preferences.
B. The Procedural Account
The procedural account holds that the public interest coincides with
the result of a democratic decision-making procedure. The latter can
be interpreted either in a pluralist or in a more deliberative manner.
In an ideal pluralist scheme, democratic politics consists of a fair
contest between interest groups, each seeking to influence the
political agenda, at the expense of others. Individuals and interest
groups are focused on promoting their own self- or group interest,
and whatever is the result of this contest for political influence –
which must be ensured to be fair, i.e., all interests ought to receive
equal consideration38 – is the public interest. Thus, as in the
aggregative account, the public interest is distilled from private
interests, but the manner in which private interests lead to the public
interest is different: It is not a matter of calculus, as it were, but
rather of democratic competition.
The question is, however, whether such a profusion of competing
private interests can ever lead to a genuinely public interest or must
A B C
Mary 1 2 3
Michael 3 1 2
Molly 2 3 1
38 Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 297.
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instead remain, to speak with Rousseau, ‘nothing but a sum of
particular wills’.39 Such concerns might lead us to adopt instead a
deliberative democratic approach to the public interest. Deliberative
democrats argue that political debate ought not to be focused on
private or group interests, but instead on the common good.40 In
fact, however, what they often argue is that deliberators still start out
with their own private interests, but that the deliberative process – in
which one has to, among other things, give reasons for one’s pro-
posals that may also be acceptable to others – can transform those
private interests in such a way that the final result of deliberation
(the law or policy decided upon) will be in the public interest. Thus,
according to the deliberative ideal, I cannot, for example, appeal to
the desire to be wealthier come what may in defending a particular
policy that will help me reach that goal. Instead, I must offer reasons
that others may find convincing as well, reasons that do not hinge on
my desire for affluence.41 It is, therefore, not the case that deliber-
ative democrats start from conceptions of the public interest rather
than self-interest. Instead, as Ian O’Flynn has perceptively pointed
out, ‘the hope is that deliberation will transform special interests into
public interests’.42 The starting point, even for deliberative demo-
crats it seems, is still a conflict of private (and group) interests.43 The
worry is, therefore, the same as with pluralist theories of democracy,
namely whether they can truly deliver a public interest.
In addition, one might take issue with the strong procedural
nature of this approach to the public interest. Benhabib, for example,
argues that ‘what is considered in the common interest of all results
39 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘Of the Social Contract’, in Victor Gourevitch (ed. and trans.), The Social
Contract and Other Later Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 39–152.
40 See, e.g., Joshua Cohen, ‘Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy’ in Alan Hamlin and Philip
Pettit (eds), The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 17–34.
41 Ibid., p. 24.
42 O’Flynn, ‘Deliberating About the Public Interest’, p. 308, supra note 30.
43 See, e.g., Seyla Benhabib, ‘Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy’, in Seyla
Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1996), pp. 67–94, p. 73: ‘the deliberative model of democracy proceeds not only from a
conflict of values but also from a conflict of interests in social life’. Also see Jane Mansbridge, James
Bohman, Simone Chambers, David Estlund, Andreas Føllesdal, Archon Fung, Cristina Lafont, Bernard
Manin, and José Luis Martí, ‘The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative
Democracy’, Journal of Political Philosophy 18 (2010): pp. 64–100, in which a number of prominent
deliberative democratic theorists argue for a greater role of self-interest in democratic deliberation.
44 Ibid., p. 69.
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from processes of collective deliberation’.44 And Cohen maintains that
‘the interests, aims and ideals that comprise the common good are those
that survive deliberation’,45 and that ‘what is good is fixed by public
deliberation, and not prior to it’.46 But how can deliberative theorists
claimboth that deliberationought to be focusedon thepublic interest and
that the public interest is the result of that very same deliberation?47 The
former claim seems to imply that the public interest exists independently
of deliberation, whereas this is denied by the latter claim. In any case, if
wewish to retain the public interest as amoral concept,we cannot simply
equate itwith the result of deliberation (or of the free and fair competition
of interests), which is an empirical matter, after all. Furthermore, we can
never be certain that citizenswill deliberate judiciously and that the result
will be satisfactory.48 Finally, even if we assume ideal conditions for
deliberation are present, and citizens exchange arguments with one an-
other in a reasonable and charitable manner in conditions that are free
and equal, then we still have no guarantee that they will agree which
policy most serves the public interest.
C. The Unitary Account
Having discussed the two most prevalent theories of the public
interest, we can see that they, though quite different, share a com-
mon problem: They both fail to sufficiently recognize that the public
interest is a substantively moral concept that is identifiable inde-
pendently both of democratic processes and of the majority interest.
To avoid this problem, we may consider the straightforwardly
normative unitary theory of the public interest, as found in the works
of Aristotle, for example. As is well known, Aristotle viewed the state
as a kind of partnership or association. Like any partnership, it is set
up for the purpose of realizing a certain good common to all
members. As it is the most encompassing of all partnerships, the
good pursued by the state is the most comprehensive good.49 The
45 Cohen, ‘Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy’, p. 25, supra note 40.
46 Ibid., p. 29; cf. Craig Calhoun, ‘The Public as a Social and Cultural Project’ in Walter W. Powell
and Elisabeth Stephanie Clemens (eds), Private Action and the Public Good (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1998), pp. 20–35, p. 32.
47 O’Flynn, ‘Deliberating About the Public Interest’, p. 302, supra note 30.
48 Ibid., p. 308.
49 Aristotle, Politics, H. Rackham (trans.), (Cambridge (Mass): Harvard University Press, 1944), I.i
1252a1–6.
ERIC R. BOOT
end at which the state aims (the good it strives to bring about)
coincides with the end each individual ought to strive towards: ‘the
best life, whether separately for an individual or collectively for
states, is the life conjoined with virtue furnished with sufficient
means for taking part in virtuous actions’, that is, human flourishing
(eudaimonia).50 There is thus, for Aristotle, no conflict between the
good of individuals and the common good of the polity as a whole.
Unitary theories of the public interest, as found in Aristotle (but
also in Plato and Aquinas, for instance) do not derive the public
interest from people’s private interests, but rather from a compre-
hensive moral theory that applies equally to private and to public
interests. Consequently, a law or policy cannot be in the public
interest if it is not also in the interest of all, and it cannot truly be in
the interest of a certain individual if it is not also in the public
interest. In other words, there can be no justifiable conflict between
individual interests and the public interest.51 Contemporary liberals
generally find this conception untenably problematic, given its pre-
disposition to paternalism – after all, any assertion of a private
interest that does not coincide with the public interest is dismissed as
misguided – and its exclusion of conflicting interests. In today’s di-
verse societies there can be no presumption of unanimity concerning
individual interests, and it is therefore problematic to assume a unity
between the individual and the collective good.
III. THE CIVIC ACCOUNT52
One of our concerns with the aggregative and the procedural the-
ories of the public interest was that they did not bring about gen-
uinely public interests. They are concerned with the ‘will of all’ rather
than the ‘general will’. So-called ‘common interest theorists’ evade
this problem as they consider only those interests to be public
interests that are shared by all members of the public. The obvious
50 Ibid., VII.i 1323b40–1324a2. Cf. VII.ii 1324a5–8: ‘On the other hand it remains to say whether the
happiness of a state is to be pronounced the same as that of each individual man, or whether it is
different. Here too the answer is clear: everybody would agree that it is the same’.
51 Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests, p. 136, supra note 32.
52 Note that the account of the public interest I develop here, differs somewhat from my previous,
very brief treatments of the subject in Boot, ‘Classified Public Whistleblowing’, supra note 5 and Boot,
‘No Right to Classified Public Whistleblowing’, supra note 18.
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critique of this position is that such interests are bound to be ex-
tremely rare (if they exist at all), rendering the concept nearly
meaningless. Even a law prohibiting (or limiting) the pollution of the
air and water (one would at least expect the interests in clean air and
water to be on the list of interests shared by all) may not be in
everyone’s interests. After all, some people profit from polluting the
air and water, and the damages to their health (from breathing
polluted air and drinking polluted water) may not outweigh the
profits to be made from their polluting enterprises. The common-
interest approach would, therefore, have to conclude that protecting
the air and water is not in the public interest.53
This implausible conclusion seems to instantly discredit the
common interest approach. Yet, if we follow Brian Barry’s account,
we may still be able to circumvent this conclusion. He points out
that disagreements over policy often spring from different people
judging the policy from the perspective of a different ‘role’. For
example, a policy to lower the speeding limit in a particular neigh-
borhood may be contrary to A’s interests as a motorist, but at the
same time in B’s interest as a parent of small children. Depending on
the role we occupy, we may judge a policy differently. Such a
conflict of interests can even be present within a single individual.
After all, with respect to a given situation, we may have different
interests as we may simultaneously occupy different roles in relation
to it (home owner, parent, employee, nature lover, and so forth).
The next step of the argument is to point out that the only role we
all occupy is that of a member of the public.54 In determining wherein
the public interest consists, we must therefore look to ‘those interests
which people have in common qua members of the public’.55
Returning to our earlier example, wemay acknowledge that legislation
aimed at protecting the air and water from (excessive) pollution is not
in the interest of some qua members of polluting industries. But, as
members of the public, they share an interest in clean air and water
with all other members. Legislation aimed at ensuring these goods is,
53 Robert E. Goodin, ‘Institutionalizing the Public Interest: The Defense of Deadlock and Beyond’,
The American Political Science Review 90 (1996): pp. 331–343, p. 338.
54 Brian Barry, ‘The Public Interest’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 38 (1964): pp. 1–18, pp. 14–5.
55 Brian Barry, Political Argument (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), p. 190.
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therefore, in the public interest ‘in the sense that it is in everyone’s
interest qua member of the public’.56 Much like Rousseau’s ‘citizen’
who only has a general will, as opposed to the ‘man’ who merely
follows his own particular will,57 in our capacity as member of the
public we will be inclined to favor policies that are in the interest of all
members of society rather than exclusively in our own private interest
(qua industrialist, home owner, employee, etcetera).
Barry’s theory of the public interest thus avoids many of the
pitfalls of the rival theories discussed earlier. It does not assume a
perfect unity between individual and community interests, as the
unitary theory does, and can thus accommodate a multitude of
different and often conflicting private interests in society, which is an
advantage of the aggregative and procedural accounts. Contrary to
those latter two approaches, however, the public interest identified
by Barry is genuinely public. He holds that if we want to promote
the public interest, we must promote interests that all share as
members of the public, whereas the aggregative approach aims to
simply maximize private interests for all as much as possible, and the
procedural approach hopes to distill shared interests from the pro-
fusion of private interests through deliberation. Furthermore, Barry’s
approach occupies attractive middle ground between the compre-
hensive moral position advocated by the unitary theory and the
subjectivist nature of the aggregative and procedural theories. The
public interest is not simply the aggregate of private interests nor is it
to be equated to the outcome of deliberation. The public interest, on
Barry’s account, is still a moral concept in the sense that private
interests are excluded from its determination: In determining the
public interest, we ought to pay heed only to our interests as members
of the public. Yet, it does not presuppose wide agreement over a
comprehensive moral theory as the unitary theory seems to do.
Finally, in identifying the public interest with the interests we
share in our role as citizens, Barry’s account coincides nicely with
56 Ibid., p. 224. Note that, contrary to the unitary theory, this account of the public interest does
allow for the possibility of x being contrary to my private interests but still in the public interest. There
is thus no presupposed unity between public and private interests.
57 Rousseau, ‘Of the Social Contract’, Bk. I, Ch. 7 [7], supra note 39. Cf. Joshua Cohen, Rousseau: A
Free Community of Equals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 54: ‘As citizens, they are not to rely
on their private will in assessing regulations or deciding whether to comply, nor are they to balance
considerations of personal advantage and of the common good. Instead, they are to deliberate about
what the laws should be by reference to considerations of the common good (common interests), and
to deliberate about conduct by giving first consideration to reasons of the common good’.
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whistleblower legislation and guidance documents, which state that
the fact that disclosure may serve the whistleblower’s private inter-
ests, is not a sufficient (or even a necessary) reason for disclosure, as
‘what may serve those private interests does not necessarily serve a
wider public interest’, which alone can justify disclosure.58
Stating, with Barry, that the public interest consists of those
interests we share qua members of the public, is a good first step, but
it is not enough for our purpose, which is to assess the feasibility of a
public interest defense for justified cases of whistleblowing. For what
are the interests we share as members of the public? Barry does not
further specify this. But one thing we now know is that the public
interest does not result from the sundry private interests we may
have. If something (a law or policy) is in the public interest, this does
not mean that it aims to realize certain private aims that specific
individuals may have. If a law or policy serves the common good (a
term closely related to the public interest59), this does not mean that
the law or policy is aimed at realizing a particular conception of the
good (or even various conceptions of the good) individuals may
have. It seems to me that the only interests we can reasonably be
said to all share in our role as members of the public are interests in
conditions that make it possible for each of us to develop and strive
to realize our own values, objectives, and life plans. Or, to put it
another way, if something is in the public interest, then it is
instrumental for the realization of individuals’ private interests, pro-
vided the pursuit of these interests does not reduce the ability of
other members of the community to pursue theirs. This civic account
of the public interest obviously does not deny that the private
interests of individual members of the community may differ from
one another and may even conflict; all it states is that the interests
we share as members of the community are interests in conditions
that need to be in place if all members are to be able to pursue their
own interests.60 For example, the unchecked arbitrary exercise of
58 Office, The Public Interest Test, p. 7, supra note 23.
59 Though some have argued that the public interest is more minimalist than the common good,
concerning chiefly material wellbeing, whereas the common good also concerns people’s moral
character and personal development (Bruce Douglass, ‘The Common Good and the Public Interest’,
Political Theory 8 (1980): 103–117.).
60 For this elaboration of Barry’s understanding of the public interest I am indebted to John Finnis’s
work on the common good, which he views as synonymous with the public interest: John Finnis,
Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2nd Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), Chapter 6.
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power by a ruler makes it very problematic to formulate a life plan,
let alone realize it, given that we do not know for sure that what is
permissible today won’t be decreed impermissible tomorrow.
Hence, the shared interest in the rule of law. Similarly, without a
sphere of protected free agency, both the formulation and the real-
ization of a life plan become extremely difficult. We thus share an
interest in fundamental human rights.61 Further examples of interests
we share in our capacity as members of the public include interests
in legal certainty, the separation of powers, and political account-
ability.
Of course, this civic account of the public interest, which expands
upon Barry’s approach to the public interest, does not do away with
all problems. In particular, it remains unclear what to do when the
several interests we share as members of the public are in conflict,
such as the interests in privacy and security. For now, we can say
two things in reply: First, the fact that public interests may be in
conflict does not demonstrate that the idea of the public interest
itself is somehow incoherent. Indeed, as O’Flynn points out, ‘the
values of freedom and equality can also conflict. But no one seriously
suggests that we should give up on those values simply because of
the many tensions that can arise between them’.62 Second, Barry
points out that ‘interest’ is a comparative concept: ‘‘Being in some-
one’s interest’ is at least a triadic relationship between a person and
at least two policies’.63 Thus, when we ask if a given policy proposal
is in the public interest, we are asking whether it is more in the public
interest than a given alternative. So, though there may be conflicting
interests all members of the public share, it may still be possible to
judge whether policy proposal x better serves the public interest than
proposal y (for example, if the benefits to privacy promised by
proposal x are quite large while the benefits to the conflicting
interest of security64 promised by proposal y are rather small, then it
61 Socioeconomic rights as well as civil and political rights. After all, a certain level of physical
wellbeing is a necessary precondition for the possibility of pursuing one’s interests and realizing one’s
objectives.
62 O’Flynn, ‘Deliberating About the Public Interest’, p. 313, supra note 30.
63 Barry, Political Argument, p. 192, supra note 55.
64 Privacy and security are here to be understood as specifications of the more general public interest
in human rights.
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would seem proposal x is more in the public interest than
proposal y).
Having thus expounded the civic account of the public interest, I
will now turn to the question what a public interest defense for
justified whistleblowing might look like.
IV. A PUBLIC INTEREST DEFENSE
First of all, the public interest defense would be a justification de-
fense. According to the most common understanding, when one
claims one’s action was justified, one concedes criminal wrongdoing,
but denies that it was, all things considered, the wrong thing to do
(e.g., A admits to having assaulted B, but argues that her action
ought to be considered justified, given the fact that B had attacked
her and she acted out of self-defense). By comparison, when one
invokes an excuse, one concedes that one’s act was wrongful (both
criminally and morally), but seeks to avoid the attribution of
responsibility for the act (e.g., A admits to having wrongfully as-
saulted B, but her mental condition is such that it would be wrong to
attribute responsibility for the act to her).65 In practice, stating that
unauthorized disclosures may be justified, means, according to this
understanding of justification, that the act of whistleblowing remains
criminal. This enables the law to continue to attach significant risks
to whistleblowing, precluding (to an extent) the occurrence of fri-
volous and willfully false disclosures, while at the same time offering
protection to those cases of whistleblowing that are justified. It,
therefore, achieves the right balance between the prevention of
undesirable acts and the protection of justified whistleblowing,
allowing the latter to continue to fulfill its vital public function of
bringing government wrongdoing to light.
In order to assess whether a particular whistleblower’s disclosure
of classified information to the media is justified, and ought thus not
to incur any sanction, the judge must ask whether the release of the
information did, on balance, more good than harm to the interest we
share as members of the political community in those conditions that
need to be in place if all members are to be able to pursue their own
65 For such an account of the distinction between justifications and excuses, see, e.g.: J.L. Austin, ‘A
Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57 (1956): pp. 1–30, p. 2;
George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 759.
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interests (e.g., the rule of law, the separation of powers, human
rights). She must determine, in other words, whether disclosure or
continued secrecy better serves those conditions. If the latter – if, in
other words, the harm to the public interest caused by her disclo-
sures likely outweighs the benefit to the public interest that would
result from making the classified information public – then the
whistleblower’s actions are not covered by the defense. If the former,
then her actions are covered by the defense, and criminal sanctions
should either not be imposed at all or should be mitigated (de-
pending on whether the further conditions of the defense, to be
expounded in a moment, are met). Of course, this does not alto-
gether do away with the problem of judicial discretion mentioned in
Section I. But it can structure that discretion by providing a frame-
work for it. For example, the civic account of the public interest
already excludes certain interests from consideration in the legal
balancing test. Furthermore, it can help us determine which shared
interests ought to be given a greater weight in the balancing test.
One can imagine if the public interest was simply determined as
‘interests shared by all’ that it would be difficult to attach different
weights to different public interests (as they all meet the key criterion
of ‘being shared by all’). Instead, I have suggested that the public
interest consists in the interest in the conditions that make it possible
for each of us to develop and strive to realize our own values,
objectives, and life plans. In realizing this possibility, some of these
conditions are more important than others. Accordingly, we can
attach varying weights to our various shared interests in accordance
with how instrumental the conditions concerned are in facilitating
the realization of our private interests. For example, good infras-
tructure is certainly in the public interest, for various reasons (be-
cause it makes trade possible, because it allows people to travel). Yet,
if the only way to expand the current congested road network were
to build a road through a natural reserve, which would seriously
contaminate the most important clean water reservoir of the
country, then such expansion would not be in the public interest,
given that clean water is a more fundamental condition for the
possibility of pursuing our private interests (hereinafter: ‘a more
fundamental condition’ for short) than the ability to travel more
quickly.
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Of course, though excessive judicial discretion (where applica-
tions of the public interest become arbitrary and potential whistle-
blowers, consequently, cannot with any certainty know in advance
how the term ‘public interest’ will be applied in their case) may thus
be limited, some discretion will necessarily remain. It seems, for
example, that different judges may reasonably disagree whether
privacy is more in the public interest than security. Still, in the case
of a real threat to national security, security will most likely be
granted greater weight than privacy, showing that it is a more
fundamental condition than privacy. After all, being alive and heal-
thy is the sine qua non for the pursuit of our interests. However,
determining where the public interest lies in a whistleblowing case
will also require us to look at the gravity of the harm to security
likely to ensue from disclosure and the significance of the benefit to
privacy. If the former is quite small and the latter is rather large, then
the public interest is ultimately best served by disclosure rather than
continued secrecy. If, by contrast, the harm to national security is
great and the benefit to privacy rather small, then the disclosure is
not in the public interest. Finally, if the harm to national security and
the benefit to privacy are judged to be more or less equal, then the
public interest is best served by continued secrecy, given the greater
weight attributed to national security.
In order to get a clearer idea of the proposed public interest
defense, let us compare it with the ‘objective list approach’, which is
dominant in legal practice and scholarship.66 The latter approach
simply provides a list of values that may justify disclosures to the
media of secret government actions, laws, or policies that threaten
those values, if other avenues for addressing wrongdoing (internally,
or externally to an independent oversight body) have been fruitlessly
exhausted. Typically included on the list are, among others, human
rights, political accountability, national security, and public health.67
There are two problems with this approach. Firstly, it does not do
away with the problem it claims to solve. The (correct) point made
66 Note that I am not referring here to objective list theories of wellbeing as discussed by philoso-
phers, particularly utilitarians. Instead, I am simply referring to the common approach found in
whistleblower protection legislation and guidance documents to draw up lists of values that may
warrant disclosure.
67 See, for example, Benkler, ‘A Public Accountability Defense for National Security Leakers and
Whistleblowers’, pp. 308–9, supra note 20; Kagiaros, ‘Protecting ‘‘National Security’’ Whistleblowers in
the Council of Europe’, p. 420, supra note 20; Tshwane Principles, Principle 10, supra note 16; UK
Information Commissioner’s Office, The Public Interest Test, p. 6, supra note 23.
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by the objective list proponents is that we need to provide some
more clarity for potential whistleblowers regarding the fundamental
concept of the public interest. However, their approach fails to do
so. After all, the various values on this list (human rights, public
health, national security, etc.) may still conflict. The whistleblower
will still have to judge for herself whether, for example, the benefits
to privacy outweigh the harm to security brought about by her
disclosure. In short, the uncertainty it set out to remove remains,
because the objective list approach does not provide us any guidance
in cases of conflict.68 The whistleblower thus still has no way of
determining which value ought to be granted more weight. My
approach does provide such guidance, as it does not simply provide
an ad hoc list of values possibly warranting disclosure; instead it
gives a reason why those values are on the list, namely that they are
conditions that need to be in place if all members are to be able to
pursue their own interests. This same reason also allows the
whistleblower to attach different weights to different values and thus
to determine which value is a ‘more fundamental condition’ (as
demonstrated in the preceding paragraph). Secondly, a limited list of
specific values also risks being too rigid and thus not adapt-
able enough to new developments. Confronted with a new type of
wrongdoing threatening a value not (yet) on the list, the objective
list approach must deny protection to the whistleblower disclosing it.
Again, my proposed account of the public interest does not suffer
from this drawback, because it does not provide an ostensibly
complete list of values justifying disclosure in the public interest, but
instead a theory of the public interest that is equally applicable to new
developments.
Still, even with the proposed account of the public interest, it
might be difficult for, say, the average civil servant to ascertain
whether the public interest would be better served by disclosure or
continued secrecy. Of course, she could consult the relevant case law
to get a sense of when the courts tend to grant protection to
whistleblowers and when they do not. Yet, the case law may not be
68 Indeed, some of its proponents admit as much: Kagiaros ‘Protecting ‘‘National Security’’
Whistleblowers in the Council of Europe’, p. 421, supra note 20.
69 Indeed, Lewis, ‘Is a Public Interest Test for Workplace Whistleblowing in Society’s Interest?’ supra
note 27, has shown the case law concerning the public interest in whistleblowing cases to be quite
inconsistent.
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consistent69 and the employee may also not be aware of the relevant
rulings. In the latter case, the potential whistleblower may seek
independent (legal) advice from the confidential adviser at one’s
workplace. As an alternative, the Netherlands has set up a so-called
‘House for Whistleblowers’ where potential whistleblowers can go
for free and strictly confidential legal advice. Yet, even when such
precautions are taken, mistakes can still be made: Information may
be disclosed, which the whistleblower believed would serve the public
interest but which, in the end, does more harm than good to the
public interest (or which, perhaps, does not point to government
wrongdoing at all). Should a whistleblower in such a case still be
allowed to invoke the public interest defense or should it only be
available to those whose disclosures actually reveal wrongdoing and
serve the public interest? Given the risks of a chilling effect, leading
potential whistleblowers to err on the side of caution and thus to
refrain from disclosing information even when it truly does reveal
government wrongdoing, it would be best to allow the defense to be
invoked in the former case as well, provided the information re-
vealed could have reasonably been believed to reveal grave gov-
ernment wrongdoing. This concession need not lead to excessive
whistleblowing,70 however, because the ‘reasonable belief’ test is not
only subjective, but also objective. Not only must the whistleblower
herself have actually believed that her disclosure would be in the
public interest (I will explain why I include this subjective test in a
moment.), but this subjectively held belief must, in addition, have
been objectively reasonable. We must ask, in other words, whether a
reasonable person71 would have believed that the information
demonstrated grave government wrongdoing that threatened one of
the interests shared as members of the public, that is, threatened one
of the key institutions that make it possible for each of us to develop
life plans and strive to realize them. Furthermore, was it reasonable
to believe that the benefit of informing the public of this wrongdoing
70 I thank an anonymous reviewer for Law and Philosophy for pressing me on this point.
71 The description of the ‘reasonable belief’ test here relies on Arthur Ripstein’s account of the
‘reasonable person’ as the person ‘who exercises appropriate foresight in deciding whether to engage in
activities that impose risks on others’. To do so involves taking both the benefits (in this case, to the
public interest) and the likely costs into account (Arthur Ripstein, ‘Equality, Luck, and Responsibility’,
Philosophy & Public Affairs 23 (1994): pp. 3–23, pp. 11–12).
72 Think, for example, of a disclosure that would also reveal the identity of undercover intelligence
officers, exposing them to grave harm.
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would outweigh the possible detriment to those institutions or to
particularly weighty private interests,72 which could ensue from
disclosing the information? If the answer is ‘no’, then the objective
reasonable belief test is not passed and the defense should therefore
not be available to the whistleblower. This should filter out frivolous
and deliberately false ‘disclosures’. If, however, the whistleblower
did all that could reasonably be expected of her to be sure that her
disclosure would be in the public interest – i.e., assure herself that
the information does indeed demonstrate grave government
wrongdoing as well as engage conscientiously in the weighing
exercise described above – if, in other words, her belief that her
disclosure served the public interest was reasonable, then the defense
ought still to be available.
Furthermore, I acknowledge that this approach may lead to some
false positives (i.e., people disclosing information they shouldn’t, yet
still having the public interest defense available to them) and though
this is of course problematic, I consider it less problematic than the
alternative. If one punishes people who reasonably believed to be
blowing the whistle on grave government wrongdoing, the result
will likely be overdeterrence: Potential whistleblowers will prefer to
err on the side of caution and thus to remain silent. Such a chilling
effect risks depriving the public of crucial information concerning
government wrongdoing.
A full public interest defense would contain two further condi-
tions, constraining the manner in which a justified disclosure ought to
be carried out. I will briefly expound them here, though my main
concern is with the public interest condition, for completeness’ sake
but also because they may help in allaying the concern (discussed in
the previous paragraphs) that my approach would result in excessive
whistleblowing. Before discussing these two procedural conditions,
however, it must first be noted that the public interest condition
must be understood as a threshold condition. That is to say, if it is not
met, the defense immediately becomes unavailable. By contrast, the
two procedural conditions determine whether the defense will func-
tion as a full defense or rather as a sentencing mitigation factor.
The ultimum remedium condition states that public disclosures
ought to be a measure of last resort. One ought to first exhaust all
alternative channels. In practice, this means one ought to first ad-
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dress the wrongdoing internally. In this manner, those in charge
have the opportunity to investigate the wrongdoing and sanction
those responsible or, alternatively, to explain why, in fact, no
wrongdoing has occurred, without involving the public at large. This
process can thus also help prevent disclosures of information that
either does not demonstrate wrongdoing, or that does demonstrate
wrongdoing but the potential benefits of the disclosure of which do
not outweigh the potential costs. Such an internal investigation
provides, after all, a first test: Is the information authentic? Does it
demonstrate wrongdoing? Does disclosure of such wrongdoing
outweigh the costs? In this manner, it can help prevent disclosures
that, upon reflection, are not in the public interest.
But, if one’s complaint is not acted upon or if one reasonably
believes the internal procedure to be infeasible (perhaps those
responsible for the wrongdoing are able to influence or even block
the internal investigation), one can then lodge one’s complaints with
an independent oversight body. This, too, makes it possible to ad-
dress the wrongdoing in a confidential manner. If both alternative
channels have been exhausted without result, or if the whistleblower
reasonably believes that making the disclosure internally or to an
independent oversight body will be in vain, or will lead to the
destruction of evidence, or to reprisals against herself or a third
party, or if the information involved concerns an imminent risk or
threat ‘to the life, health, and safety of persons, or to the environ-
ment’,73 then the whistleblower may reveal the information to the
public.
The minimize harm condition enjoins the whistleblower to take all
possible steps to minimize the harm that may ensue from her dis-
closure. Especially when the information concerns matters of na-
tional security, unauthorized disclosures may cause substantial harm
to undercover agents in the field, to ongoing military operations, and
to national security. In order to mitigate such harm, the whistle-
blower would be wise to collaborate with established media outlets
who can help edit the information so that only the information
strictly necessary to reveal the wrongdoing is made public and
nothing more. Experienced journalists can, furthermore, help
determine the information’s authenticity as well as present the
73 Tshwane Principles, Principle 40a, supra note 16.
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information in such a manner so that the intended audience will
adequately receive and comprehend it. The imposition of this con-
dition is thus another way to prevent undesirable unauthorized
disclosures. Together with the ultimum remedium condition and the
objective ‘reasonable belief’ test, it should go a long way in pre-
venting unauthorized disclosures that are not in the public interest.
The attentive reader will have noticed that I have not included
the ‘good faith condition’, which several whistleblower protection
laws do contain.74 The reason for the omission is simple: what
matters is the content of the information. So long as the public
interest condition has been fulfilled, it is irrelevant that the
whistleblower’s motives were not entirely immaculate. If disclosure
serves the public interest, to be determined by the objective reason-
able belief test, it does not matter that the whistleblower also had a
private interest in disclosure. The thought is that a disclosure can still
be in the public interest, even though it may also be in the private
interest of the whistleblower. Disclosing Watergate, for example,
was certainly in the public interest, even though personal resentment
(over having been passed over for promotion) may also have played
a role. So the whistleblower need not be a perfect Kantian agent who
acts solely aus Pflicht (from duty) in order to benefit from the public
interest defense. We need not require that her motivations be
exclusively public-spirited. What we should require, however, is what
has already been mentioned above, namely that the whistleblower
must have actually held the belief that her disclosure would better
serve the public interest than continued secrecy.75 The reason why is
that such a subjective reasonable belief test renders the public interest
defense unavailable to so-called ‘unknowing necessity cases’.76 A’s
case constitutes a case of unknowing necessity if her disclosure is, as
a matter of fact, necessary to avoid a greater threat to the public
interest, but she acted in ignorance of this information. Imagine, for
example, that A randomly discloses classified documents simply so
74 See, e.g., the case law of the European Court of Human Rights: e.g., ECtHR, Guja v. Moldova, §
77, supra note 14; Heinisch v. Germany, no. 28274/08, §§ 82–87, (ECtHR 2011); Bucur and Toma v.
Romania, no. 40238/02, §§ 116–118, (ECtHR 2013).
75 I thank an anonymous reviewer for Law and Philosophy for pressing me on this point.
76 For interesting discussions of such cases see, e.g.: Larry Alexander, ‘Lesser Evils: A Closer Look at
the Paradigmatic Justification’, Law and Philosophy 24 (2005): pp. 611–643, pp. 626ff.; Mitchell N. Ber-
man, ‘Lesser Evils and Justification: A Less Close Look’, Law and Philosophy 24 (2005): pp. 681–709, pp.
702ff.
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she can impress her friends with her security clearance. As it hap-
pens, the information she discloses actually does more good than
harm to the public interest. Still, we would not want the defense to
be available to A. Our reasons could be both consequentialist
(denying her the defense could help prevent her (and possibly others,
through deterrence) from engaging in such frivolous disclosures in
the future) and retributivist (by denying her the defense, we prevent
her from getting away with such dangerous and irresponsible
behavior). To sum up, the whistleblower need not have acted in
good faith, understood as having immaculate motivations. She must,
however, have actually believed that her disclosure would be in the
public interest.
Finally, if the whistleblower has met all three of the above con-
ditions – public interest (consisting of both an objective and a sub-
jective reasonable belief test), ultimum remedium, and minimize harm
– to the best of her ability, then the only way the government can
maintain its position that the unauthorized disclosure is unjustified
(and the whistleblower, therefore, ought not to enjoy legal protec-
tion against retaliation) is by arguing that, for example, the
whistleblower was in no position to adequately assess where the
public interest lies (with disclosure or with continued secrecy), be-
cause she did not have access to all the relevant information, causing
her to overlook a specific and substantial harm to the public interest
that outweighs any benefits to the public interest effected by the
disclosure.
Before discussing possible objections to the public interest defense
for classified public whistleblowing as provided in these pages, let us
pause and take stock. The public interest defense is a justification
defense. For the defense to be fully available to the whistleblower,
her disclosure must meet three conditions: the public interest con-
dition (consisting of both an objective and a subjective reasonable
belief test), the ultimum remedium condition, and the minimize harm
condition. If the first condition is not met, the defense is unavailable.
If the latter two are not met, the defense will likely serve to mitigate
the sentence rather than function as a full defense. For the public
interest condition to be met, the benefit to the public interest
brought about by the disclosure must outweigh the possible harm
caused by it (or it must at least have been reasonable for the
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whistleblower to believe that it would). In practice, this requires
weighing against each other competing interests we share as mem-
bers of the public, which I have defined as interests in those con-
ditions necessary for the possibility of pursuing our private interests.
In cases of conflicting public interests (privacy and security, for
example), the defense requires the judge to determine which of the
competing shared interests involved is the more fundamental con-
dition for the possibility of pursuing our private interests. Further-
more, it requires a determination of the extent of the harm done to
security, say, or to particularly weighty private interests, and the
significance of the benefit to privacy. Perhaps, generally speaking, we
might say that security is a more fundamental condition than pri-
vacy, but if the detriment caused to the former by the disclosure is
relatively small and the benefit to the latter is rather large, disclosure
is still in the public interest and thus the defense ought to be
available to the whistleblower. Finally, even if it turns out no
wrongdoing was involved, or that there was wrongdoing but the
harm caused by disclosure in fact outweighs the benefits brought
about by it, the defense ought to still be available, provided that it
was reasonable for the whistleblower to believe that her disclosure
was in the public interest and that she actually held this belief.
V. OBJECTIONS
A first possible objection to this public interest defense for whistle-
blowing (let us call it the epistemic constraints objection) would argue
that it demands too much of the potential whistleblower; if she
wants her disclosures to be covered by the defense she will need to
determine where the public interest lies and, in cases of conflict,
which of the shared interests outweighs the other. Furthermore, she
will need to make an assessment of the possible harm that could be
precipitated by her disclosure and weigh that against the benefit to
the public interest. Some might doubt that an average civil servant
possesses all the relevant knowledge to make such an assessment.
Lower-level civil servants in particular may not have access to all the
information necessary to determine whether a secret policy involves
grave harm to the public interest and whether disclosure would
involve harm to national security, say, or to third parties. David
Estlund would argue that in such circumstances the civil servant
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ought to refrain from disclosing the secret policy in question and
respect its classified status, because it is the result of an institutional
process with significant epistemic value. Our best evidence, he
maintains, that a policy is morally acceptable is that it is the product
of an institutional process designed to duly look after the question
whether it is just.77 It follows that a civil servant acts wrongfully, for
epistemic reasons, by substituting her own private judgment for the
state’s decision, which is the result of an institutional process with
significant epistemic value. A public interest defense, according to
this line of argument, would not be desirable as it would encourage
civil servants to take it upon themselves to weigh the public interest
in disclosure against the public interest in continued secrecy, whereas
this is properly a public task, provided the political and institutional
processes are aimed at arriving at the right answer.
There is some merit to this objection, and indeed I have already
conceded that the determination of where the public interest lies is
not without its difficulties. However, I have also pointed out that
there are ways to attenuate this difficulty (e.g., by seeking out (legal)
advice, and consulting the relevant case law). Furthermore, there are
plenty of cases of relatively straightforward wrongdoing: Watergate,
Abu Ghraib, political corruption. In these and similar cases, the fact
that the individual civil servant does not possess all the facts is not
likely to be an obstacle for adequate moral judgment.
A further reply to this objection is that often a civil servant may
feel compelled to blow the whistle precisely because the institutional
procedures that are usually abided by, and which, according to Es-
tlund, produce authoritative commands due to their ‘effort and
tendency to get the right answer’,78 are set aside or are defective. As
an example, consider the executive’s decision to wage war without
first consulting and obtaining approval from the legislature. In such a
case, Estlund’s argument would no longer apply as the very proce-
dure which results in authoritative commands has been bypassed.79
77 David Estlund, ‘On Following Orders in an Unjust War’, The Journal of Political Philosophy 15
(2007): pp. 213–234, p. 222.
78 Ibid., p. 221.
79 Indeed, Estlund seems to concede this point and even argues that ‘[s]oldiers lower down in the
chain of command also have a responsibility to ask themselves whether justice is being looked after’
(ibid., p. 226), that is, whether the institutional and procedural safeguards are functioning properly.
80 Sagar, Secrets and Leaks, p. 120, supra note 11.
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The second objection concerns what Rahul Sagar has termed the
‘incommensurability of interests’.80 He argues that there is no firm basis
on which we can weigh, for example, the public interest in security
(which presumably calls for secrecy, at times) against the public
interest in political accountability (which requires transparency).
This, too, is a valid point. It is my hope, however, that the civic
account of the public interest (defense) expounded in these pages can
be a guide in what Sagar describes as the ‘messy reality’ of interest
balancing.81 It allows us, first of all, to identify public interests as
interests that we share as members of the public in the conditions
that make it possible for each of us to develop and strive to realize
our own values, objectives, and life plans. Furthermore, it enables us
to attach different weights to our various shared interests in accor-
dance with how instrumental the conditions concerned are in facil-
itating the realization of our private interests. The more fundamental
a condition is for the possibility of pursuing our private interests, the
greater the weight that ought to be attached to it. In deciding, finally,
whether disclosure or continued secrecy best serves the public
interest, we ought also to consider the degree of harm involved with
disclosure and the magnitude of the benefit.
Now, Sagar is of course right to point out that all this may be
difficult to do for a judge who has to decide whether a particular
unauthorized disclosure was in the public interest. But I am more
optimistic regarding the courts’ ability to reach such a decision. They
are generally quite able to deal with complex and controversial is-
sues. In hate speech cases, for example, the judge must also under-
take a complicated balancing test: She will need to weigh the value
of the individual’s right to freedom of expression against the harm
his hateful speech is believed to cause to an already marginalized
ethnic or religious minority. The harm involved is often not very
concrete or specific. Yet, the court will have to attach a particular
weight to it and consider whether the prevention of such harm
outweighs the value of free speech. Similarly, Heidi Kitrosser won-
81 Ibid.
82 Heidi Kitrosser, ‘Classified Information Leaks and Free Speech’, University of Illinois Law Review 3
(2008): pp. 881–932, p. 913: ‘In such [complex] cases, parties bring the courts up to speed through
evidence and briefings. Among the judiciary’s strengths in this respect are its familiarity with studying
complex factual records and accompanying briefings, its ability to demand additional information and
expert assistance from the parties, and its ability to call in court-appointed experts for additional
assistance’.
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ders whether whistleblowing cases are really more complex than the
intricate environmental, scientific, and financial cases, which courts
are deemed capable of dealing with.82
Despite the courts’ general ability to successfully deal with
complex cases, however, their application of the public interest in
whistleblowing cases thus far has been criticized as ad hoc and
idiosyncratic (as pointed out already towards the end of the intro-
duction). Yet, the problem was not so much the courts’ judgment or
their ability to study complex documents, but rather that they had to
exercise their otherwise considerable capabilities in the dark, as it
were, with little to no guidelines to assist them. It is precisely this
lack that the civic account of the public interest (defense) aims to
remedy. The guidance provided by it, combined with the courts’
substantial abilities, should be sufficient to adequately deal with
public interest defenses of whistleblowing, or at the very least to
improve the courts’ disappointing track record so far. The com-
plexity of weighing interests against each other, therefore, does not
warrant the abandonment of the public interest defense as ex-
pounded in this article.
The third objection – the reasonable disagreement objection – does
not so much argue that the whistleblower is in no position to judge
where the public interest lies due to epistemic constraints (as with
the first objection), but rather that, even if she were in possession of
all the relevant facts, there could still very well be reasonable dis-
agreement over how the relevant facts ought to be judged. Informed
people may still disagree over whether a given classified policy
constitutes a threat to the public interest and thus whether its dis-
closure serves the public interest or not. Creating a defense, the key
term of which, so this argument goes, is necessarily open to inter-
pretation, will only generate more disputes than it settles. Further-
more, the ambiguity of the central concept will make it all the easier
for a government to dismiss a whistleblower’s appeal to the public
interest as ‘just another interpretation’. In short, the argument goes,
a public interest defense will not resolve anything, due to the
indeterminate nature of the public interest.
Once again, my first reply would be that there are plenty of cases
of uncontroversially wrongful government conduct (e.g., abuse of
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power, political corruption, Abu Ghraib, Watergate). Such cases are
not susceptible to this counterargument.
Furthermore, reasonable disagreement does not necessarily pre-
sent an argument against disclosure if the wrongdoing in question is
procedural rather than (exclusively) substantive. For example, the
problem with the government’s implementation of a secret larges-
cale domestic surveillance program is not only that some might
deem it unjust, but rather that such a policy is a matter of public
concern (as it impacts fundamental rights), about which, accordingly,
the public ought to be informed. If what matters is that citizens are
able to form an opinion concerning the policy in question through
public debate,83 which is made impossible by the policy’s secret
nature, then reasonable disagreement concerning the policy’s desir-
ability is not an argument against disclosure.
Finally, though there can be no disagreement over which interests
are public interests (according to the civic account defended here,
public interests are interests in those conditions that make it possible
for each of us to develop and strive to realize our own values,
objectives, and life plans), it is possible for there to be disagreement
over the weight we ought to attach to our various shared interests.
But is this a problem for the functioning of the defense? I believe it is
not. Recall that the whistleblower who wishes to benefit from the
defense need not show that her assessment of what better serves the
public interest (disclosure or continued secrecy) is ultimately the
correct one. Instead, she needs to demonstrate that she had a rea-
sonable belief that her disclosure revealed a threat to the public
interest and that the benefits of disclosure would outweigh the
possible associated harms to the public interest. (Recall, too, that our
reason for this approach was to avoid a chilling effect.) It follows that
reasonable disagreement (between the whistleblower and the gov-
ernment) over the weight to be assigned to competing public
interests cannot be a ground for denying the whistleblower the de-
fense. Indeed, typically this is not the approach taken by govern-
ments. Often they will decide to prosecute a whistleblower not
83 Of course, the government need not (and at times ought not to) publicize each and every detail
concerning the secret policy, as that might very well undermine the policy’s functioning, endanger
national security, or have other undesirable effects. Often, however, the government can disclose the
general contours of the policy, which can safely be the subject of public debate. Dennis Thompson
refers to this as ‘partial secrecy’ (Dennis F. Thompson, ‘Democratic Secrecy’, Political Science Quarterly
114 (1999): pp. 181–193).
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because she incorrectly attached more weight to privacy than to
security, for example, but rather because her disclosures allegedly
damaged national security more than she had (or even could have)
foreseen. In other words, the problem is not so much that the
whistleblower attached too little weight to the shared interest of
security, say, but rather that she made an incorrect assessment of the
harm that might ensue from her disclosure. She may thus fail to
meet the second procedural condition (after all, minimizing harm
presupposes a sincere effort to adequately assess the possible harm).
In this case, the defense could at most function only as a sentence
mitigating factor. However, she might also fail to meet the first
condition (the public interest condition). This condition requires
weighing the benefits of disclosure against its possible harmful
consequences. If the whistleblower did not make an adequate
assessment of the potential harm that might ensue, or was perhaps
even negligent in making the assessment, then she fails the public
interest condition as well, in which case the defense is not available
to her at all. But the burden of proof then lies on the government to
demonstrate that the unauthorized disclosure has indeed caused far
more harm to the public interest than foreseen by the whistleblower,
and that this harm outweighs the benefits of disclosure.
In sum, typically the argument the government would make is
not that we ought to attach a greater weight to security than to
privacy or political accountability, say, but rather that the whistle-
blower has made an incorrect assessment (perhaps negligently so) of
the harm that might ensue from her disclosure. It is thus not pri-
marily a matter of reasonable disagreement over values, but rather
of incorrect assessment of harm. The reasonable disagreement
objection, therefore, misses the mark.
VI. CONCLUSION
As announced at the outset, this paper set out to (1) clarify the
concept of the ‘public interest’, and (2) to determine whether a
public interest defense is feasible and desirable. Regarding the first
point, Section III presented the civic account of the public interest,
which expands upon Barry’s account of the public interest. The
interests that we share in our role as members of the public, i.e.
public interests, are interests in the conditions that make it possible
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for each of us to develop and strive to realize our own values,
objectives, and life plans. In other words, the interests we share as
members of the political community are interests in conditions that
need to be in place if all members are to be able to pursue their own
interests. Examples of such conditions are the rule of law, the sep-
aration of powers, human rights, legal certainty, and political
accountability.
Regarding the feasibility and desirability of the public interest
defense for whistleblowers presented in Section IV, the previous
section has shown that it is not without its difficulties. However, I
also hope that my replies to the objections discussed there as well as
my exposition of the public interest and the public interest defense in
Sections III and IV respectively, have demonstrated that such a de-
fense certainly is workable and feasible. The civic account of the
public interest provides sufficient guidance for judges to undertake
the necessary balancing test. This ought to do away with the ex-
cesses of judicial discretion, which at present leads to legal uncer-
tainty, which, in turn, may lead potential whistleblowers to refrain
from disclosing government wrongdoing for fear of retaliation. The
defense is, therefore, indispensable (and thus desirable). Without it,
we risk depriving ourselves of what has become the most important
source for finding out about government wrongdoing. In sum, the
public interest defense, despite its difficulties (which I have shown to
be generally surmountable), is feasible as well as necessary. More-
over, it is our only option to provide protection to justified cases of
classified public whistleblowing, given the untenability of a rights-
based defense.
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